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“To be remedied of any vendetta” :
Petitions and the Avoidance of Violence
in early modern Parma1
Colin Rose2
Les Ducs de Farnèse dominèrent la province de Parme, en Italie du Nord, 
de 1548 à 1731. Un aspect important de leur domination fut leur ouverture 
aux requêtes et supplications de leurs sujets. Ces pétitions destinées à des 
souverains absolus, émanant de sujets de diverses positions sociales, 
fournissent une documentation très riche sur les relations entre ducs ou 
princes et les populations sur lesquelles ils régnaient. La thèse de cet article 
est que les sujets du duché de Parme utilisaient les canaux de  communications 
offerts par le système bien établi des pétitions et des requêtes en appel pour 
 s’épargner  l’obligation de résoudre querelles et  conflits sociaux par la 
violence. Il est important de noter que les malfaiteurs paraissent eux-mêmes 
avoir calculé leurs crimes en fonction de la probabilité  d’un pardon ducal, en 
cherchant à menacer plutôt  qu’à blesser, ou à insulter plutôt  qu’à agresser. 
Le système des requêtes était géré par le Consiglio della Dettatura, tribunal 
faisant partie intégrante du système judiciaire farnésien. Lors du déclin 
de cette dynastie, ce système permettait à une grande partie des sujets des 
Farnèse de protéger leurs intérêts tout en se soumettant à  l’autorité ducale.
The Farnese dukes dominated the province of Parma, north Italy, from 
the period 1548 to 1731. An important characteristic of their rule was their 
receptiveness to petitions and supplications from their subjects. Petitions from 
subjects of varying social positions to absolutist rulers provide a wealth of 
information pertaining to the relationships between dukes or princes and the 
populations they ruled. This article argues that the subjects of the Farnese 
duchy of Parma relied on the relationships of channels of  communication 
provided by a well-entrenched system of petitions and appeals as a way to 
relieve themselves of the obligation to resolve quarrels and social  conflicts 
1 The author is grateful to the anonymous readers for their careful criticism and suggestions. This arti-
cle is indebted to the support of many colleagues : Dr. Gregory Hanlon, who supervised the research ; 
Dr. Nicholas Terpstra, who supervised the writing ; Dr. Edward Muir and the graduate students of 
Northwestern University ; the many colleagues from the University of Toronto who  contributed time 
and ideas, particularly John Christopoulos and Vanessa McCarthy ; and to Saman Jafarian. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada.
2 Colin Rose is a PhD Candidate in History at the University of Toronto, Canada, where he also 
 completed his Bachelor of Arts before taking his  Master’s degree at Dalhousie University, Halifax, 
Canada. His research interests relate to the intersections of social and legal history, specifically long-
term criminal and deviant behaviour seen through a social lens. His dissertation in progress will 
survey homicide rates in Bologna, Italy, from the period of 1550-1700 to test the hypothesis of a 
European decline of violence against a Northern Italian archival sample. He currently works in the 
archives of the Tribunale del Torrone,  Bologna’s secular criminal court in the early modern period.
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through violence. Importantly, malefactors also seem to have calculated 
their crimes in accordance with the likelihood of receiving a ducal pardon, 
tending to threaten rather than wound, or insult rather than attack. The 
system of petitioning was operated by the Council of Sentencing (Consiglio 
della Dettatura), a tribunal that developed as an integral part of the Farnese 
judiciary system. By the waning of the Farnese dynasty, petitioning allowed a 
broad swath of Farnese subjects to protect their own interests while submitting 
to the authority of the ducal regime.
INTRODUCTION
Late in October, 1637, one Alessandro Mariano wrote a petition to the duke of Parma, Odoardo Farnese (1622-1646). Mariano  complained that, earlier 
in August, he was investigated by the Parman  chief criminal judge, the Auditore 
Criminale, because “he might have killed Gironimo di Pastori in the village of 
Borghetto […] and because [Mariano] wishes to prove his innocence in this crime of 
which [he] was impugned, he has decided to turn himself in.” However,  Mariano’s 
petition went on to explain, “he doubts that some evil will not be ordered against him 
when he will be in prison.” Therefore, his petition requested that “[Mariano] may not 
be interrogated for any other matter than for the abovementioned homicide”3. What 
these other matters were, the petition did not say. However,  Mariano’s  chief  concern 
was the possibility of being punished for the murder which he apparently did not 
 commit, and Mariano opted to surrender to the authorities rather than risk a sentence 
in absentia. The duke ratified the petition, and added that Mariano would be granted 
a safe  conduct on  condition that he spent ten days in jail in Parma upon his surrender.
This article is about petitioning and violence, and their intersection in seventeenth-
century Parma. Why did Mariano surrender to the authorities for a violent crime he 
did not  commit, and why was he incarcerated regardless ? What purpose did his 
petition serve in this case ? Here, petitioning refers to the process by which subjects 
appealed to authorities for assistance in resolving a wide range of issues ; in Italy, 
this  constituted a system of supplications written by notaries, working within 
judicial structures. Historians have done much work on petitions in the last decade, 
noting the ability of petitions to increase the personal power of a ruler, often at 
the expense of bureaucratic processes or even in prejudice to the rights of higher 
authorities4. Petitioning in France also served to strengthen the institutions of royalty 
and government, if the royal  body’s presence produced a lasting effect of obedience 
through the passage of a royal tour5. Muchembled used French petitions explicitly 
to study violence in Artois, and argued that while adhering to a standard of truth and 
being revealing of  people’s habits and customs, they do not provide historians with 
3 Archivio di Stato di Parma (hereafter ASPR), Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio 
della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali¸bb.43, #1166.
4 An early, and very astute, analysis of the ways in which petitions (in this case, for homicide pardon) 
served the interests of both the royal authority and the petitioners themselves is Davis (1987). Cf. 
Logette (1994) ; Niccoli (1995, 2007) ; Nubola (2001) ; Nubola, Wurgler (2004) ; Nubola, Belloni 
(2006) ; Repetti (2000).
5 Gauvard (1997, p. 281).
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direct access to a history of criminality6. Early modern Europeans used petitions to 
place their behaviour into ordinary, or even banal, circumstances, and thus petitions 
reveal much about the role of violence in social life in the early modern world.
At the same time, recent scholarship into the ducal states of early modern Italy has 
revealed the ways in which aspiring rulers meddled in the affairs of their magistracies, 
subverted their own orders, or ignored official corruption in order to pursue a more 
expansive supreme authority situated in the ducal persona7. Subjects and supplicants 
themselves were also inclined to strategic use of court systems. From the medieval 
period, a time associated with the rationalization of courts, citizens and residents 
of cities used litigation to damage their enemies, by staining their reputations or 
instigating an endless series of judicial processes against them8. Early modern courts 
were thus arenas of negotiation, between individuals, and between individuals and 
institutions, in which the subjects of absolutist governments both propagated and 
resolved their social  conflicts9.
Europeans’ use of courts to settle  conflicts expanded at the same time as 
historical rates of violence declined in a long-term process10. Violence in this article 
is primarily empirical : it refers to physical aggression between individuals or groups 
with the aim of inflicting wounds or humiliation. This could be either reciprocal or 
one-sided victimization. Manuel  Eisner’s 2003 database of historical data on violent 
crime throws its empirical decline into sharp relief, revealing that from England to 
Finland, in the Netherlands as in Switzerland and Germany, rates of interpersonal 
violence fell dramatically, with Italy experiencing a decline later, in the mid-
nineteenth century11.  Eisner’s synthesis demonstrates the strength of a  comparative, 
quantitative method in this field : in order to assess properly the behavioural changes 
that Europeans seemingly underwent, a longue durée analysis of statistical trends, 
with  consideration of source quality and the roles played by specific social groups 
in any findings, is necessary to document the incidence of violence itself. This was 
done for the British Isles in the 1970s, but has not been done for specific regions of 
Italy and much of the  continent12.
However, a statistical picture of levels of violence can simply demonstrate 
the phenomenon, not explain it. Here, agreement among historians falters, and 
explanations derive from two streams of thought. The first stream follows Elias’ 
theory of the civilizing process. Scholars in this vein argue that changes to socio- 
cultural forces, notably  concepts of male honour, reduced the violent tendencies of 
European males. The argument, simplified for brevity, goes as follows. As Europeans 
 6 Muchembled (1989, p. 17)
 7 Chambers, Dean (1997, pp. 113-146 & 179-232) ; Terpstra (2001) ; Waquet (1992, p. 153).
 8 Smail (2003, pp. 89-132).
 9 Mantecón (2006).
10 These rates of violence are usually expressed in homicide rates, as a measure of violent deaths per 
100,000 people. Two survey works cover most of the literature  concerning non-fatal violence as well 
as homicide. Eisner (2003) provides the background to any case study of non-fatal violence ; Spieren-
burg (2008) emphasizes the decline of fatal violence and the transformation of notions of “honour” 
among elites as the mitigating factor most germane to the long-term decline.
11 Eisner (2003, pp. 95-99). Eisner›s data for Italy are not as  complete as for other areas ; more archival 
work needs to be done in both North and South Italian archives before firm  conclusions may be 
reached.
12 Beattie (1974) ; Cockburn (1991) ; Given (1977) ; Hammer (1978).
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defined male honour less by lineage and physical strength, and more so by personal 
 comportment, fashion and good manners, deadly elite violence gave way to stylized 
duels ; the lower classes responded by developing their own honour codes and 
ritualizing their own violence13. Historians have modified the civilizing process to 
pertain to violence, and have  confirmed its applicability to observable declines in 
violence14. The increasing criminalization of violence by state authorities, according 
to these authors, did more than just cause people to  consider the costs of their actions : 
Spierenburg argues that demonstrable changes in levels of human aggression and its 
typologies are the manifestations of genuine changes to human emotional make-up, 
as a result of which humans are not only less inclined to violence, but less capable 
of the inclination itself15.
A counter-school of thought sees violence as a social strategy available to all 
people at all times, who employ it among other tools, such as the law, to advance 
what they see as their interests and thus give it some kind of  communicative meaning. 
Anton Blok takes this view in his anthropological work, noting that “people have 
developed strong feelings about […] violence. They are inclined to  consider[…] [it] 
as the antithesis of civilization,” before arguing for  violence’s strong  communicative 
power16. For historians, this has meant a reconsideration of the decline of violence 
and its place in early modern society. Thus, Stuart Carroll argues against the 
civilizing process and the expansion of the French monarchy as determining factors 
in the decline of elite violence in sixteenth-century France. French nobility retained 
the prerogative to use violence strategically to advance their own interests ; if they 
chose not to do so, it was because they recognized better opportunities for social 
and personal advancement in their local social milieus and within the royal  house’s 
expansion, while in fact the duel did not  constitute a ritualized violence, but an 
amplified and more bloody violence indeed17. Gregory Hanlon and Paul Hyams take 
views similar to  Carroll’s in their works on  conflict in seventeenth-century Italy and 
late-medieval England. Hanlon brings forth the many arenas of minor and deadly 
 conflict between Tuscan villagers and illuminates the fact that “there was a variety of 
individual responses to different problems”18. Hyams looks at attempts by medieval 
English kings to extend a “ king’s peace” and dampen the incidence of feud, and finds 
that even if monarchy wished to centralize, and to impose a standard of behaviour on 
nobles, feuding remained a basic category of social interaction for medieval English 
elites19. Common among these cases is the idea that cycles of retributive violence 
tend to be self-limiting, because the costs of endless violence are not practically 
bearable20.
This article seeks to unify these two views by proposing that while early modern 
Europeans  continued to  consider, and to exercise, violence as a functional strategy 
of social  competition, this functionalism was curbed by the evolution of institutional 
13 Gallant (2000) ; Muir (1993, p. xxix) ; Spierenburg (1994, 1996, 1998).
14 Spierenburg (2001, 2008).
15 Spierenburg (2001).
16 Blok (2003, p. 103).
17 Carroll (2006, p. 25).
18 Hanlon (2007, p. 9).
19 Hyams (2003, p. 71).
20 Carroll (2006, pp. 7-8) ; Hyams (2003, pp. 14, 34, 83, 92 & 108).
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structures encouraging  conflict resolution through negotiation and participation in 
legal systems21. People retained the propensity for violence in many situations, as 
they do today. However, processes of centralization and absolute expansion had real 
effects on the choices made by ordinary people. When presented with options that 
offered non-violent solutions to  conflicts, subjects tended to pursue these routes, and 
over time these options became first the best and then the only functional options 
within the bounds of society. We should therefore look for practical explanations 
of how European peoples managed the  control of violence throughout the early 
modern period. Historians need to  consider how populations seized the opportunity 
for active participation in the  control of  community violence. This study assesses 
how the process of petitioning the ducal court  constituted one such mechanism in 
seventeenth-century Parma, Italy.
The duchy of Parma in the seventeenth century is an appropriate focus for such 
a study for two reasons. First, the seventeenth century may be  considered a period 
of governmental stability in Italy. The absolute states that formed in the sixteenth 
century had, for the most part, established themselves under firm dynastic  control 
by the early seventeenth century22. The Farnese overcame local opposition to their 
rule in 1612, and reigned in an unbroken line until 1731. They are a paradigmatic 
absolute dynasty. Thus, the duchy of Parma provides a stable background against 
which we may isolate violence and petitioning to determine their interaction. 
Second, seventeenth-century Italy has not received the attention paid to the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries in English scholarship, particularly with regards to the 
interactions between absolute states and their populations. One goal is thus to 
encourage scholars to look beyond traditional “renaissance” periodization to find 
 continuities and disruptions between these centuries.
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME : THE JUDICIARY OF PARMA
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The duchy of Parma was located in north-central Italy, south of the Po and west 
of Bologna. In the seventeenth century, its population was approximately 300,000 
between the cities of Parma and Piacenza, and the outlying towns and settlements. 
The dukes referred to here, Odoardo I (1622-1646) and Ranuccio II (1646-1694) 
were ducal monarchs who received petitions from their subjects through a body 
known as the Council of Sentencing (Consiglio della Dettatura)23. These petitions 
21 For the study of violence in particular, historians must not avoid  confronting the psychological and 
behavioural influences that lay behind the expression of  culture, including violence. Cf. Blaffer-Har-
dy, Hausfater (1984) ; Daly, Wilson (1988) ; Diamond (1992, pp. 223-316) ; Pinker (2002, pp. 306-
336). Historians working with these materials include Hanlon (2007) and Hyams (2003). A recent is-
sue of the British Journal of Criminology (Eisner, 2011) is devoted to the application of evolutionary 
models to violence across a range of topics, from violence in non-state societies to judicial violence 
in Nazi Germany. Steven  Pinker’s monograph on the grand historical decline of violence phrases this 
interaction of individual and institutional pacification in terms of human mental and emotive inclina-
tions towards or away from violence (2011).
22 I here use « absolute » as a signifier, while recognizing that the reality of early modern monarchical states 
was much more fluid and dependent upon negotiation and elite goodwill. Cf. Henshall, (1992) ; Collins 
(2009). A recent analysis of the importance of petitions for an emergent absolute dynasty is Shaw (2012).
23 The roles of the maternal regents who governed during the minority of these two dukes begs investigation. 
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 constituted an important element of the judicial system. Parmans could write 
petitions addressing civil and criminal issues. They divide loosely into six categories : 
Judicial (asking for pardon for a crime), Protection (requesting help solving private 
 conflicts), Favour (seeking employment at the court, for instance), Charity (often 
from widows or young women), Tax Reduction or Extension, and Debt Relief or 
Collection. Petitions thus drew a range of issues under the authority of the Farnese 
judiciary. The Farnese dukes entrusted the administration of the Dettatura to a series 
of officers and Presidents, whose powers and responsibilities expanded over time as the 
Farnese saw opportunities to increase the reach and efficiency of government.
The Dettatura was the appeals court of a judicial system that  combined central 
courts with a network of councils and officials that brought information and people 
into Parma from the countryside. In the city, a  chief criminal judge (Uditore Criminale) 
relied upon a rudimentary system of police (sbirri) to apprehend criminals, and he had 
independent responsibility for urban cases as well as for those from the many fiefs 
in Farnese land. He judged from three criminal benches in Parma. This judge also 
decided cases involving feudal, military and poaching laws. His membership on the 
Supreme Council of Justice and Mercy, which vetted all sentences of death, mutilation 
or long-term galley service, gave him jurisdiction over the entire Farnese territory. At 
the same time, the judge needed the approval of this Supreme Council to approve 
his sentences of execution, mutilation, or long-term galley service. Investigations 
in the countryside were carried out by municipal governors (Podestà) who reported 
their  conclusions to the Supreme Council in Parma24. The Dettatura functioned as 
an appeal court in this system. Plaintiffs and defendants could request pardon from 
the Dettatura, while the criminal judge and his counterpart, the civil judge, could 
each request a decision, taken by vote, from the  council’s members25. The  Dettatura’s 
decisions were  confirmed by the President of the Supreme Council, who was also a 
member of the Council of Sentencing. The membership of the Dettatura included the 
presidents of the Fiscal Camera, which governed tax and budgetary matters, and the 
Congregation of the Communes, which governed the widespread operations of rural 
village councils26. Thus, the Dettatura brought a range of  competencies under one 
jurisdiction, and this efficient centralization of the appeals process is characteristic of 
the relatively simple judiciary of the Farnese state.
Two key elements of the Farnese judiciary provide the “official” view of the 
petitioning process. These are the magistracy responsible for the  system’s operation 
(Consiglio della Dettatura), and a book of prescriptions (the Rituale) that regulated 
the fees and other administrative business arising from petitioning. The Consiglio 
della Dettatura was one of the most powerful bodies in the administration of the 
Parman state throughout the seventeenth century and until the end of the Farnese 
dynasty in 173127. It possessed ultimate jurisdiction over most criminal and civil 
The involvement of the duchess Dorotea in eighteenth-century petitions may hint that they too received, 
adjudicated and declared on the petitions of regular subjects. Without a body of petitions addressed to 
either of them, likely  conserved in the Archivio di Stato di Parma, a thorough analysis of their priorities 
and those of their petitioners is precluded, but this is certainly an area of research worth pursuing.
24 Di Noto (1980, pp. 91-105).
25 Di Noto (1980, p. 75).
26 Ibid.
27 The council was originally established by Ranuccio I in 1594. At that time, it possessed jurisdiction 
over both the major cities of the Farnese State. Confusion and inefficiencies, as well as accusations 
“TO BE REMEDIED OF ANY VENDETTA”  11
matters, arbitrating disputes and determining penalties for crimes. The dukes of 
Parma found in this council a means of entry into the daily affairs of subjects. Its role 
as such helped to effect a shift that would see the population turn first to the courts 
and the state for assistance in solving  conflicts, before violence overcame them28.
However, the dukes imposed limits on the ability of the Dettatura to act on its 
own authority. The council had the right to decide whether to grant or to reject a 
petition, but it had to draft the response (rescritto) according to certain rules laid out 
in the Rituale, a book  compiled with the  duke’s approval29. This book regulated the 
taxes on criminal petitions (suppliche), ascribing certain fees for a pardon for crimes 
depending on their severity and the likelihood of the petition being granted. Thus, 
although given a certain amount of responsibility, the Dettatura was nevertheless 
always under the thumb of the dukes.
The rules of that ducal thumb were found in the Rituale noted above, which 
exhaustively lists the gamut of appealable issues – specifically pardonable crimes – 
and the fines that attended a petition. The Rituale lists the prescribed fees for 
supplications in a section entitled ‘Regulæ Generales Dictaturæ’. The preamble 
 continues with some basic guidelines for supplication. For instance, no homicide 
 committed in anger could be supplicated without a three-year interval and the prior 
 concession of a pax from the  victim’s family, thus encouraging the killer to make 
his primary amends with the victims30. This requirement has medieval antecedents 
based on the notion that homicide was primarily an offense against a  victim’s kin, 
and secondarily against the  king’s law. In medieval England, the  king’s attempts to 
act against homicide were thwarted by the determination of the nobility to demand 
their own satisfaction and peace-making processes31. By the early modern period, 
however, Italian governments freely prosecuted homicides using inquisitorial 
process, so no  complaint from family was required to initiate an investigation. The 
requirement for a peace accord in Parma is thus a functional  continuity reflecting 
structural change. While prosecuting homicides as crimes, the Farnese also allowed 
the victims’ families a modicum of input. This not only legitimized the  duke’s 
pardon, by ensuring its acceptance among the victims of crime, but also ensured 
that potential retributive violence was foresworn by those likely to take vengeance. 
The manual also dictates a general rule for the taxation of supplications, that the 
of localism and favouritism, soon led the duke to withdraw the Dettatura to Parma while instituting 
a separate Ducal Council in Piacenza. It originally oversaw the arbitration of civil disputes submitted 
by subjects, but when its efficiency and usefulness were made clear to Ranuccio, he expanded its 
jurisdiction to include civil and criminal cases, as well as those emanating from the feudal territories 
of Busseto and the upper Taro valley. The five-man council thus received petitions from Farnese 
subjects until 1731. These petitions, or a great deal of them, are  conserved in the Archivio di Stato di 
Parma, in the collection of Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali.
28 Other programs were aimed at noble pacification as described by Angelozzi (2003) ; Di Simplicio 
(1994).
29 Biblioteca Palatina di Parma (hereafter BP), MS Parmeggiane, Miscellanea Farnesiana, #554. This 
document was written anonymously in 1596, shortly after the council was instituted by Ranuccio I. It 
systematically defines the duties of much of the Farnese judiciary while also tabulating the penalties 
affixed to the punishment of delicts, and establishes the terms of pardon in Parma.
30 BP, MS Parmeggiane, Miscellanea Farnesiana, #554, p. 3. The granting of a peace accord from the 
 victim’s kin to the slayer was a  common requirement of pardons for homicide across the  continent. 
Hurnard (1969) ; Davis (1987) ; Smail (2003).
31 Hyams (2003).
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fee for a granted petition be set at 1/5 the potential judicial fine for the pardoned 
crime32. Finally, before listing the prescribed fees, the guide describes how to craft 
a rescritto, the different types of which are examined in Paola  Repetti’s analysis of 
the crafting of Parman suppliche33. The Rituale amounted to a formalization of the 
means of petitioning : if they wished to access ducal mercy, Parmans were required 
to follow a defined series of legal actions, beginning with the drafting of a petition, 
that emphasized the unequal power relationships between ruler and ruled. Moreover, 
the  Council’s development over time allowed the Farnese to  continue drawing 
private dispute settlement into the legal framework of the state. This association 
of private and public justice afforded the dukes a  concrete identification with the 
social problems and needs of their subjects, while at the same time pacifying the 
behavioural responses of Parmans to threatening situations.
Regardless of their input into the system, Farnese dukes did not review or 
involve themselves in the majority of their subjects’ petitions. They were  content 
for most petitions to be treated on a day-to-day basis by their high magistrates. 
However, they promulgated decrees (gride) that modified the terms and function 
of the Dettatura, and these decrees are indicative of the attitudes with which they 
viewed petitioning and its relationship to their authority. The success and failure 
rates of ordinary petitions, and those petitions that bore ducal scrutiny, show how 
petitions encouraged subjects to work within the Farnese judiciary. This system 
allowed Parmans to express their social needs while at the same time  constraining 
their behaviour, or the behaviour of their social adversaries.
Like the Tudor monarchs of England, Farnese dukes publicised special decrees 
of general pardon, called decreti gratiosi, which celebrated a momentous occasion 
in the dynastic household such as a royal birth or the ascendancy of a new duke34. 
In 1628, Odoardo declared one such decree to celebrate his marriage to Margherita 
 de’Medici, the daughter of Cosimo II35.  Margherita’s signature on the decree was 
her formal entry into the role of Duchess (Duchessa), and the general pardon that 
accompanied the ducal marriage was an attempt to affiliate the subject population, 
and its welfare, with the Farnese dynasty and its future as represented by the young 
duke and his new bride. A new general pardon was decreed in 1629 to celebrate 
the Duchess’ pregnancy with  Odoardo’s son Ranuccio, the future Ranuccio II ; this 
decree was extended and renewed repeatedly36. The last renewal came in February 
1631 and noted specifically the  duke’s awareness that his previous decrees had not 
served “those who are far away, or truly for diverse reasons have been prevented 
from being able to enjoy the benefits of the said decree”37. To remedy this, the 
decree  commanded senior officials in Parma, Piacenza, Borgo san Donnino and the 
Congregation of the Communes (Congregazione sopra Comuni) to publicize the 
month-long extension as widely as possible to ensure that all subjects had effective 
access to the general pardon. Public demonstrations of the strength of the Farnese 
32 BP, MS Parmeggiane, Miscellanea Farnesiana, #554, p. 2.
33 Ibid., I-IV ; Repetti (2000, pp. 301-305).
34 On the general pardon in England, see Kesselring (2003, pp. 56-90).
35 ASPR, Gride, #184.
36 ASPR, Gride, #202 ; Ibid., #229, unnumbered decrees of 2 and 5 March 1629.
37 ASPR, Gride, #229.
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dynasty were accompanied by royal grace to cement their subjects’ identification of 
well-being with the stability of the Farnese.
The dukes also used irregular decrees to transform judicial offices. In a 1661 
decree addressed to both the officers and notaries of the Dettatura, Duke Ranuccio 
II laid out the grounds on which his councillors would best fulfil his “personal 
patronage no less than [their] public service”38. This decree was a  comprehensive 
rendering of the necessary security of the  Dettatura’s physical offices and of the 
document archive it governed. The offices had two keys, kept by the chancellor and 
vice-chancellor. Only the chancellor or vice-chancellor were authorised to write and 
sign rescritti in the name of the duke, and if supplicants requested copies, they were 
required to do so of the  Dettatura’s staff notaries and the copy itself had to be made 
within the  Dettatura’s offices. The decree ordered that originals of all supplications 
be kept under lock and key. Responsibility for the maintenance of security and 
the inviolability of the  Dettatura’s physical edifice, and hence their political and 
moral authority, was given to the two chancellors already tasked with responding 
to supplicants. In this way, the duke drew a direct line of authority from himself, 
through the chancellor and vice-chancellor, to those subjects who abased themselves 
at the feet of his magistrates and begged his assistance in their social  conflicts.
The decline in violence, the growth of ducal authority in the princely states of 
the Italian peninsula, and the formalisation and regulation of the means for subjects 
to appeal to and petition the state authorities are intimately related. As Italian 
states crystallised in the seventeenth century, systems of petitioning became more 
expansive, encompassing a broader range of issues from criminal pardon to social 
assistance and tax relief39. Like their counterparts in other major and minor cities, 
the Farnese  consistently prescribed harsh penalties and mediated their application 
in practice. Additionally, after a brief spike in numbers in 1636, capital punishment 
in Parma declined to a level averaging about one a year by 1700, and one every 
three years thereafter40. No longer inclined to demonstrate their power through the 
public gallows, the Farnese exploited the potential of suppliche. The Farnese income 
from petitions  constituted approximately one percent of annual revenue in the late 
seventeenth century, and cannot be  considered a significant windfall. The Farnese 
dukes instead recognised that petitioning could help to stabilise a population that 
was increasingly dependent upon the ability of a single dynastic house to maintain 
order in the cities and villages of the state. As a reliable means to solve problems 
without the risks of violence, petitioning drew Farnese subjects away from private 
justice and into the expanding judiciary.
PETITIONS, VIOLENCE AND PERSONAL RULE
1,440 petitions drawn from six bundles at approximate fifteen-year intervals from 
Parma demonstrate how Farnese subjects approached the apparatus of government 
and attempted to influence the decisions of high-level officials41. Additionally, a 
38 ASPR, Gride, V40 :94, unnumbered decree of 29 June 1661.
39 Forclaz (2006, pp. 76-77 & 166-181) ; Cancila (2009, p. 323).
40 Meredith (2008, pp. 92-103).
41 The records of the Consiglio della Dettatura are  conserved in the font Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia 
e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali in the Archivio di Stato di Parma. 
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series of administrative materials and correspondence reveal the ‘official’ workings 
of the Council, and how the Farnese dukes involved themselves personally in the 
appeals by subjects and influenced the decisions of senior magistrates. Those cases 
in which the dukes, particularly Ranuccio II, took a personal interest illuminate 
clearly the  configuration of princely politics that is also visible in the workings of 
the Medici regime. The  combination of judicial correspondence and petitions allows 
for a qualitative assessment of the ways in which petitioning  constituted a reciprocal 
process.
Table 1 : Number of petitions per category per year in Parma.42
Year CR P F C TR DR Total
1631 78 2 0 0 76 0 156
1637 198 3 4 1 197 0 403
1644 12 13 57 0 2 13 97
1659 3 8 25 4 4 16 60
1687-9 96 1 0 0 355 4 456
1727 7 21 136 102 0 10 276
Total 394 48 222 107 634 43 1448
As Table 1 demonstrates, the petitions from the early seventeenth century refer 
primarily to criminal matters, with a scattering of civil misdemeanours and financial 
issues throughout the bundles. This is partly due to the impact of the Thirty Years 
War, as well as the lasting trauma of recurrent plague cycles. Thus, in both 1631 
and 1637, petitions requesting judicial pardon accounted for close to 50 percent of 
petitions (78/156 and 198/403 respectively), indicating that subjects, particularly 
the soldiers who were numerous in the city in this decade, tended to shoot or rob 
first, and ask for pardon later. Petitions from later in the century were more varied 
in subject matter, and those which  concerned violent criminality are much reduced 
by 1687-1689, when they accounted for less than 25 percent (96/456) of the  serie’s 
total. Thus, a decline in the proportion of petitions presented to the duke requesting 
reprieve from the penalties of crime and violence may indicate two things. The first 
is that interpersonal violence in Parma declined over the period. This article cannot 
prove this decline statistically ; however, it is in line with much of the evidence for a 
European decline in violence. The second is that violent resolution of interpersonal 
There are approximately 250 bundles of petitions dating from the mid-sixteenth until the nineteenth 
century (the Supremo Consiglio remained in operation until 1815, first under Spanish rule and then 
under and after Napoleon). My selection of bundles was essentially random. My goals were to es-
tablish a representative chronology of Farnese subjects over the seventeenth century, and to view 
these subjects within different  contexts, such as plague recovery. The one non-random selection 
was the bundle from 1637, which was chosen specifically because it followed a humiliating 1636 
military campaign launched by Odoardo Farnese. The chance to read a high volume of soldiers’ and 
 militiamen’s petitions pushed me to select this year specifically.
42 CR= criminal reprieve ; P = protection ; F= Favour ; C= Charity ; TR= Tax Relief ; DR= Debt Relief. 
The selections of bundles was essentially random, with the exception of 1637, chosen for its proxim-
ity to the Battle of Tornavento in 1636. Source : ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e 
Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e memoriali, Bb 40, 43, 45, 5, 60, 65.
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 conflicts gave way to appeal to judicial forces, and the growing number of petitions 
requesting ducal protection from enemies supports this notion. These types of 
petitions accounted for 1.2 percent of petitions in 1631 (2/156), more than 10 percent 
in 1659 (8/60) and 7 percent in 1727 (21/276).
However, this program of intensely personalised power relied fundamentally on 
the active participation of both the dukes and their subjects in the system of petitioning. 
Parman citizens knew the system, and used it well. The Farnese judiciary operated 
under the inquisitorial system, and subjects progressed through it as follows : The 
 complaint of a plaintiff was not required to initiate procedure. Upon the report of 
a crime, either by denunciation or because it was discovered some other way, a 
police force (sbirri) attempted to apprehend the criminal. If they were successful, 
the suspect faced inquisitorial trial behind closed doors by the Uditore Criminale or 
one of his assistant judges, and was subjected to torture in order to ensure full and 
truthful disclosure43. Once interrogation was  complete, the judge  compiled reports 
of questions and answers, and provided this evidence to the defence, who then had 
the opportunity to review it with the accused. The defence then  compiled his own 
report and gave it to the judge, who pronounced sentence. This  concluded the initial 
phase of the judicial process. The Dettatura could become involved in two ways. 
First, the judge himself could request input from the Dettatura into his decision, 
and the council would vote on the issue and return their answer44. This was done in 
cases where the outcome was unclear, in cases of disputes where the parties were of 
sufficiently high status to challenge the decision by a single judge, or where the judge 
felt that the additional input of the Dettatura would give the sentence more gravity, 
especially in capital cases where ordinary judges did not have the  competency to 
declare a death sentence unilaterally. Alternatively, if the defendant was declared 
guilty and sentenced, he or she could appeal the sentence directly to the council, 
by having a notary draft a petition to the council that outlined the reasons why the 
defendant believed him- or herself worthy of pardon. If  convinced, the judges of the 
council drafted the rescritto according to the established rules.
The familiarity of subjects with the necessary formulae for successful petitions 
indicates that appealing to the Dettatura was a regular aspect of the early modern 
Parmans’ daily encounter with state authority. The broad range of issues they petitioned 
and the prominence of particular social groups, such as militiamen, show that Parmans 
strategised their petitions and may have refrained from submitting a supplica until 
they  considered their chances of success to be most favourable. Further, certain 
petitions provide very suggestive evidence for an active turn by Parman subjects to 
state authority in avoidance of personal  conflict and violence. The ways in which the 
Farnese dukes, particularly Ranuccio II, treated these exceptional petitions illustrate 
the  conception of princely rule that motivated their interference with the judicial 
system, and link the pacified behaviour of Parman subjects to the strengthening of the 
personal ruler through visible and functional  communicative mechanisms.
A sample will make clear the material analysis of petitions below. The following 
is the petition of Antonia Mussona, who in 1644 was brought in front of the Criminal 
Judges (Auditori Criminali) for her involvement in a quarrel with unknown enemies. 
She addressed herself to the Dettatura as below :
43 On the inquisitorial system of  continental Europe generally, see Spierenburg (1984, pp. 8-9).
44 Di Noto (1980, p. 71).
16 COLIN ROSE
Antonia Mussona, humble servant and petitioner of your Supreme Illustrious 
Magistrates, reminds you how she has been molested by the Criminal Office of 
Parma that wants to punish her for a fight, and make one of her sons pay her fine. 
But the petitioner being poor, having nothing else from which to live, because 
her husband  consumed all she had and not having any more, it was necessary to 
go into service to support herself, this way being deprived of two daughters, they 
having gone to the service of the Serene Prince in Candia. Now the poor petitioner 
genuflects at the feet of your Supreme Illustrious Magistrates, humbly supplicating 
that they would  consider giving her grace by ordering that the petitioner should no 
longer be molested for this quarrel, and also that whatever there is about her in the 
criminal books be overturned, for all this the petitioner hopes to obtain from your 
Supreme Illustrious Magistrates. Quam Deus45.
The  communicative strategies employed by Parmans in their petitions are a good 
starting point to illustrate the active engagement of Farnese subjects in the program 
of suppliche e rescritti. Petitions all begin with obsequious praise for the benignity 
of the duke or his officers. This honorific address, clearly stipulated by notarial 
prudence, took a variety of forms that stressed those ducal qualities that petitioners 
wished to invoke. Thus, some petitions stress the “most serene” nature of the duke, 
while others emphasise his royal highness, and others still focus on his “immense 
clemency and goodness” (immensa clemenza e benignità). The notary likely chose 
the most fitting obsequy for the  petitioner’s tale, and then copied the story into the 
petition. This technique served to establish the abject position of the petitioner, 
kneeling in tears at the  duke’s feet for mercy.
The familiarity of subjects with these requirements indicates an almost scripted 
regularity to Parman petitions, whose literary form is remarkably  consistent across 
the bundles examined here46. Parmans identified themselves as “humble and devoted 
servants” of the duke while at the same time submitting repeated supplications 
designed to steadily decrease their taxes owed to the crown47. Indeed, petitioners 
understood well the benefit of repeated supplication, and strategised their petitions to 
address first the legal issue they faced, and secondarily, to evade the fees on petitions 
themselves. Criminal petitions, particularly, took a typical form. The petitioner, who 
 committed crime x, petitioned the Dettatura for the free grace and remission of 
45 «  L’Antonia Mussona humil.ma serva et oratrice delle ss.ie VVMme gli espone qualmente viene 
molestat dal officio criminale di Parma col volerla pignorare per una querella, qual pretendono che 
paghi un suo figliolo, e essendo  l’oratrice povera, non havendo cosa alcuna  con che vivere, havendosi 
il marito  consumato quanto haveva et non havendo  con che vivere, è stata necesitata andare a servire 
per sostentarsi,  come anco essendo priva di due figlioli, essendo andati al servicio del Ser.mo Pincipe 
in Candia. Hora la povera oratrice genuflesa a piedi delle Ssrie VVMme quelle humil.te supplicando 
degnarsi fargli gracia di ordinare, che  l’oratrice non sia gravata ne molestata per tal causa, et anche 
sia cassato detta que ne Da  come anco altre se ve ne fosse dalle libri Criminali, che tanto  l’oratrice 
spera ottenere dalli Ssrie VVMme Quam Deus. » ASP, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e 
Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali, bb. 45.
46 This is much in line with Davis’ analysis of petitions, in which particular features of a pardon letter 
were seen as stock elements indicating the required states of mind, regret and a lack of premedita-
tion, but  contrary to  Muchembled’s study of pardon letters from Artois. Muchembled instead empha-
sises the mundane aspects of pardon letters, which, he argues, place the misdeeds of French nobility 
against a background of everyday ordinariness in order to deemphasise their behavioural transgres-
sions. Davis (1987) ; Muchembled (1992).
47 Margarita Spadania, for instance, submitted two petitions in 1631, progressively lowering the fine 
she owed for what appears to be a public decency infraction. ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia 
e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali, bb.40, #905 & #1132.
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guilt (ogni gratia e libero dono). These petitions seem overly ambitious, for the 
magistrates were unlikely to grant such a request for even minor delicts. Common 
procedure was thus to grant a pardon with certain  conditions attached. Gioseffo di 
Costa, called Fallopieno, received one such pardon in 1637 for insolence to a public 
official48. Attendant to his pardon was a fine of six gold scudi, which di Costa had 
no intention of paying. He promptly submitted a second petition that emphasised his 
poverty and previous service in the ducal militia to justify his request to have the 
fine eliminated, or reduced significantly. Petitioners such as di Costa were prepared 
to invest a  considerable amount of time and effort into pursuing their needs through 
the Dettatura, even recognising long-term strategies that would reduce the burden of 
the legal system on their finances and social capital.
The subjects of the Farnese were familiar with the option of presenting a case 
to a supreme governmental body, and recognised the benefits they could gain by 
taking this option. Two series of petitions will demonstrate how this relates to the 
decline of violence. The first  concerns petitions that focus on violent crime, or 
crime-related violence,  committed by the petitioner : simple assaults, robberies, 
brawls and fights that involve weapons. Significantly, this series shows that over 
the century Parmans, particularly soldiers, developed a preference for firearms 
display, rather than ritualistic knife fighting as seen elsewhere in Europe. The second 
series  contains petitions that precluded acts of violence, and requested protection 
from the  petitioner’s rivals or enemies. Parmans now employed the legal system 
to their advantage. As noted by the Rituale, the fine for a fight in which blood was 
spilled, for instance by a skilful knife- fighter’s attack on his  opponent’s cheek, was 
significantly higher than unlicensed possession or display of a firearm. Thus, in their 
daily  conflicts, Parmans may have  considered the costs and benefits of potential 
violence, specifically their ability to avoid significant punishment by appealing to 
the Dettatura, and chosen more symbolic means of displaying and acting out status 
 competitions and other disputes in the early modern city.
In 1636, Duke Odoardo led a Parman army to counter the threat of a Spanish 
invasion of Piacenza49. The high numbers of soldiers and militiamen present in 
the Duchy around the time of Duke  Odoardo’s experiment with military glory 
overloaded the records in 1637 with petitions from quarrelsome soldiers. Their 
petitions show how these men interacted with each other and with the local citizenry. 
Due to their training, soldiers typically were more inured to interpersonal violence 
than shopkeepers ; these petitions, therefore, are not representative of the violent 
behaviour of all Parman subjects, but nevertheless display the careful attitude taken 
towards illicit violence by soldiers50. Of course, these men went too far on occasion. 
There are fifteen extant petitions for homicide in this entire series of petitions, 
fourteen of which date from the years 1631 and 1637, and all these cases involved 
soldiers either as aggressors or victims, and frequently both. In these instances, the 
48 ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Supplica e Memoriali 
bb 43, supplica of Giosetto di Costa, #849.
49 Parrott (2001, p. 118). While the siege was broken by the aid of a French army which initiated battle 
with the Spanish at Tornavento on 22 June 1636, Odoardo was left in an untenable political position 
after the French failed to  consolidate their victory and solidify  control of the area around Milan. 
Odoardo made peace with the Spanish in early 1637.
50 On the psychology of soldiers and the training required to inculcate the capacity for violence, see the 
work on drill and repetition in Grossman (1995).
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Dettatura refused to reintegrate violent offenders into the legal strictures of the state ; 
soldiers who did not resort to fatal violence could expect a much more favourable 
treatment by the judges.
Soldiers seem actively to have avoided homicidal violence, in order to decrease 
the difficulty of any potential encounter with the judicial apparatus. That said, they 
calculated displays of status and strength that minimized the danger of a judicial 
burden. The least risky display strategy was the public flaunting of a weapon in areas 
associated with authority, sanctity or safety51. Churches fit the bill. On 12 September 
1637, Giovanni Domenico Scacalea petitioned the Dettatura to review his sentence 
for carrying his schioppo, a type of early shotgun, to church in his native village 
of Torchiana, and to eliminate the fine entirely, based on the record of his militia 
service to Odoardo52. In what must have been a shock to the petitioner given the 
relatively minor offence, his fine of four gold scudi was  confirmed by the Dettatura, 
who rejected his petition outright. In  contrast, Cesare  Stachi’s petition appealing the 
outstanding funds of the twelve scudi, that he was fined for twice bringing his gun 
to church and once pointing it at an adversary during a quarrel, was granted on the 
basis that he had already paid a fair portion of the balance53. The difference accorded 
to these two petitions indicates that the duke was not wont to give free absolution 
to misbehaving soldiers ; rather, the bonds of fealty and submission created by the 
payment of even a small amount of money allowed for the advancement of mutual 
interests. The petitioner avoided more serious punishment and was still able to 
threaten and intimidate, while the duke drew power to himself by deciding the fate 
of even minor miscreants.
Churches were not the only public places where soldiers  committed this type 
of firearms infraction. Local  festival celebrations were another excellent field on 
which to demonstrate virility in a public setting without the need to engage in actual 
violence against an adversary in order to prove dominance. Thus, Diminio Pintio, 
a musketeer in the ducal militia, was  condemned to the regular four gold scudi fine 
for bringing his loaded weapon to a dance. His petition was rejected because he 
also pointed the weapon at an official of the local church54. The ducal court was 
also a firearms-free zone. The soldier Giovanni Antonio Gonzi brought his loaded 
weapon to the court in December 1637 and was assessed a low fine of one scudo, 
which was repealed subsequently by libero dono55. All of these were public areas in 
which soldiers could take advantage of the judicial structure provided by the regime 
to display their status in  competition with social rivals. They were also places with 
strict regulations prohibiting public violence. The willingness of soldiers to replace 
physical violence with aggressive posturing in the public space defined by authority 
indicates the effectiveness of systems of petitioning in  communicating the goals and 
51 Hanlon (1985, pp. 244-268). Hanlon notes similar behaviours among Aquitainians, who were more 
likely to brandish a firearm than to fire it when  considering the costs of their action.
52 ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memo-
riali, bb43, #860.
53 Ibid., #1017.
54 ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memo-
riali, bb40, #1039.
55 Ibid., bb43, #626.
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ambitions of both subjects and the regime, helping to drive any behavioural changes 
that seventeenth-century Parmans may have undergone.
Gun infractions were not limited to soldiers. On 12 July 1631, Giacinto Bigolli 
submitted a petition to have the payment on his judicial fine of four gold scudi 
delayed and broken into instalments56. Giacinto was guilty of the public display 
of his schioppo at the church in Colorno. His petition received the brief rescritto 
characteristic of petitions arising from minor infractions of no terrible  concern to 
the duke or his magistrates : a brief affirmation of the grace given. However, most 
firearms infractions were  committed by soldiers.
Farnese soldiers and subjects also developed a much more vivid form of postural 
violence as they moved away from the physical resolution of social  conflict to more 
restrained social relations. As mentioned above, the judicial fines for both the crime 
and the pardon were increased significantly when a  culprit drew blood from his 
adversary or his victim. Parmans thus adapted a form of non-lethal display violence 
that required no physical mark like a scar on a cheek to demonstrate the  victor’s 
superior status. Numerous petitioners related how, when threatened by adversaries, 
or desiring to threaten adversaries in turn, they produced their weapon, either from 
a carrying “holster” or from its storage in their house, and began to load it in front 
of the man or woman they wished to intimidate and dominate. Thus, Nicolo Orti, 
a town official from Lizzano di Belvedere, belatedly reported in 1631 that Pietro 
Rufaldi and two others from Campia di Langhirano “loaded an archebus in front of 
Lorenzo del Casino, of the said town of Campia”57.  Orti’s petition in fact asked for 
forgiveness for neglecting to denounce this infraction.
This case has two particularly tantalizing aspects which throw the motivations 
of both criminals and authorities into clear relief. First loading a gun was an 
infraction warranting a denunciation by a public official in an outlying town to a 
central authority. The importance of interaction between centre and periphery 
towns in  contexts of strong government is clear, as historians have noted in colonial 
 contexts but equally germane to the discussion here58. Previously, central  control 
of local governance in outlying towns was haphazard and hampered by systemic 
and structural difficulties59. By the seventeenth century, however, the Farnese dukes 
were demanding – and enforcing – involvement in the most minor  conflicts in rural 
villages, regardless of feudal borders. Clearly, the Farnese dukes were not interested 
solely in social  conflicts that featured physical violence. Rather, the judicial 
apparatus of the Farnese state encouraged officials to involve themselves actively 
in their villages’ social fabric and quell tensions before or as they arose, referring all 
cases of potential violence to the central courts.
Secondly, the three malefactors noted in  Orti’s petition apparently had no 
intention of carrying their threat further at the time. Loading an archebus in front 
of his enemy was Pietro  Rufaldi’s particularly illustrative technique to demonstrate 
his superior male status. This was a very effective means to  communicate hostility, 
because the cost, in terms of investment and involvement in a legal process, was 
relatively low  compared to both the cost of physical violence and the benefit of 
56 Ibid., bb40, #1086.
57 Ibid., unnumbered petition of Nicolo Orti.
58 Burke (1998) ; Hanks (2010, Ch.1-3).
59 Connell, Zorzi (2000, pp. 165-183 & 207-224).
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restraint. Of course, had Pietro fired the gun, either injuring or killing Lorenzo, he 
may not have escaped incarceration, exile or galley service. In addition, he would 
have lost the social capital associated with status and dominance in rural areas. 
Local towns too were thoroughly hierarchical, and villagers were well aware of the 
relationships and status of many of their covivants60. The simple solution was to 
load, but not fire, the weapon, thus counteracting both these costs of violence. As we 
have seen, the local official, Nicolo Orti, did not even bother to report this infraction 
to the central authorities, at least not in a timely manner. When he did report it 
and was punished for tardiness, his fine was promptly rescinded by the Dettatura. 
There are no further instructions to Orti for prosecuting the case. Thus, the legal 
cost of non-violent status display was effectively nil,  compared to a steep judicial 
fine or the prospect of hard labour in the galleys and mines. By restraining personal 
violence in status displays and choosing non-violent aggression, Farnese subjects 
could avoid the judiciary entirely, or face a significantly reduced punishment for 
firearms infractions that the Dettatura, in all likelihood, would review favourably.
The years when soldiers were  concentrated in the city and petitioned in unusually 
high numbers also provide the most reliable data on the success or failure of these 
petitions. For 1631, 1637 and 1687-1689, the bundles  contain petitions that have 
the rescritto written directly on the document ; in other years,  common practice 
was to attach a small writ with a blot of wax, and these have not survived61. In 
1631, of 83 total petitions included in the bundles, 62 received an affirmative 
rescritto while 21 did not, for a success rate of 74.6 percent. In 1637, the success 
rate is lower, at 61.1 percent (129/211), which could be related to the aftermath of 
 Odoardo’s 1636 campaign and the need to recuperate funds and restore order. Fifty 
years later, the picture is remarkably similar to that in 1631. In 1687-1689, of 456 
petitions submitted, 346 were granted, for a success rate of 75.9 percent, practically 
indistinguishable from the 1631 rate. What these numbers tentatively indicate is the 
regularity with which ducal grace was dispensed, and the calculated use of mercy to 
promote the ducal persona without denigrating his authority and the judicial force 
that backed it.
The above petitions all  concerned acts of violence  committed by the petitioner, one 
of the two broad categories that  concerned violence, and which attracted the personal 
attention of the duke. Broadly speaking, Farnese dukes, in particular Ranuccio II and 
his son Francesco (1694-1727), took an active interest in petitions that bore on their 
authority in relation to other regional princes and in those that potentially threatened 
the paternal relationship between themselves and their subjects. The latter category 
is most interesting, for it demonstrates how the Farnese regime provided for Parmans 
an alternative to violence. Subjects themselves responded to the opportunity for 
governmental intervention by referring  conflicts with violent potential, or those with 
violent beginnings, to the duke and his ministers. This second category of petitions, 
 concerning acts or threats of violence  committed by the  petitioner’s rivals, also 
received the  duke’s personal attention.
Attached to letters between the duke, his councillors and his judges, the petitions 
of ordinary Farnese subjects expressed their fear of the violence, retaliatory or 
60 Astarita (1999) ; Hanlon (2007) ; Smail (2003).
61 ASPR, Supremo  consiglio di giustizia e  consiglio della dettatura, suppliche e memoriali, bb. 40, 43, 
60.
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provocative, of their cohabitants in the city or outlying towns. In 1675 one of 
these vividly relayed the instability caused by the violence of roving men in the 
countryside. An unidentified cleric of Castellazzo begged the duke to provide his 
town with “some provisions that I think are necessary, so that in this and other states, 
no one will say that Your Highness does not  commend himself highly to God, and to 
His honour”62. This petition followed a horrific raid carried out by “twelve or more 
armed men, to assassinate my household” and to “rob the women of their honour.” 
In what seems at first an unrelated aside, the anonymous cleric emphasized the 
relationship upon which he based this request, a particularly interesting formulation 
from a churchman : the duke knew well the troubles of the church of Castellazzo 
(flooded, the cleric noted incidentally), where the petitioner “assisted for 35 and 
more years,” and which was now about to collapse. The local bishop refused to 
fortify either the church or the town, and so the petitioner appealed to the duke 
for aid in protecting his household, because the duke did not have “[his] hand in 
 anybody’s purse.” The petition requested town walls and guards to protect the 
church, such that Holy Mass could proceed without the fear of raid and rape on 
the town. Although the  duke’s response to this petition is not indicated, the present 
issues of authority, personality and protection make clear the function of petitioning 
in the  context of violence : tools such as petitions enabled a population to turn to the 
ducal government for aid rather than pursue a private vendetta or live in perpetual 
fear. Conversely, the petitioners emphasized the grand authority of the duke, drawn 
directly from God and more useful, even to clergy, than the ecclesiastical hierarchy 
in securing the physical safety of Farnese subjects.
The most lucid evidence for this analysis emerges directly from the words of 
petitioners and dukes. Did they see themselves as shifting away from a system of 
private violence to one in which subjects’ interests were best served by princely 
authority ? Did Parman subjects no longer view their immediate kin networks as the 
first instance of safety, protection and legitimate quarrel and violence ? A petition 
from one Barbara Galli, dated 1705, indicates her discomfort and fear at the prospect 
of her male relatives engaging in a kin war63. The feud began, in fact, between 
Barbara and her enemy, Giulia Zanelli, “a woman of much inferior  condition to that 
of the petitioner,” who “solely out of ill will fomented by her husband” harassed 
and “many times assaulted the honour of [Barbara], all of which also threatened 
her very life.” Out of a desire to maintain “her proper decorum” Barbara “never 
wanted to cause the slightest injury[…] in all ways preventing this undertaking in 
which her husband and relatives will become involved,” and had in fact moved her 
family to another part of the city, “principally to be remedied of any vendetta.” This 
Parman subject demonstrates precisely the phenomenon under analysis here : by the 
eighteenth century, Parmans actively rejected private violence and employed the 
machinery of the state to prevent the outbreak of vendetta. Barbara appealed to the 
duke to “order your Uditore Criminale[…] to go to the house where Giulia presently 
lives, and  command [her] to stay within the required limits” of her behaviour64.
62 ASPR, Atti Giudiziali, Lettere di Giustizia, bb32, 1675 Agosto-Dicembre, letter of 26 December.
63 ASPR, Uditore Criminale di Parma, Lettere Ducali  ad’Uditore Criminale, bb33., unnumbered letter 
and attached petition of 29 September 1705.
64 The idea that this may refer to an early modern « restraining order » is tantalising but unverifiable.
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The dukes, too, made clear that they rejected the interpersonal violence of subjects, 
bringing their personal power to bear on even the domestic  conflicts of subjects. 
Sexual and marital impropriety had for centuries been the jurisdiction primarily of 
local groups, usually  comprising the  town’s or  quarter’s unmarried youthful males, 
who exercised an allegedly ritual violence against the bodies and properties of those 
they  considered to have stepped beyond the bounds of local moral propriety65. But 
by the end of the seventeenth century, even this  community enforcement of morality 
was frowned upon in Parma. Thus, in 1695, Francesco Farnese ordered his Uditore 
to,
observe this attached memorial, from a certain Barbara Preti, who says she is 
treated barbarously by her husband Basilio Grassi. This woman long served the 
Most Serene Princess Maria Maddalena […] call this Basilio, and make him 
understand that if he does not change his ways, we will change them for him, 
along with other corrections from my hand66.
Barbara herself feared “to lose both her body and soul” at the hands of her husband, 
and evidently could not count on the moral indignation of the local youth to protect 
her from her  husband’s abuse. She relied on the only recourse she had : direct appeal 
to the duke, who fortunately bore her a particular good will based on her long 
 connection to his own family.
This petition, and the  Duke’s reply, makes clear that Parmans participated 
willingly in the system of petition and appeal, effectively integrating their lives with 
the structures of local and ducal authority, such that even the marital household was 
subject to the intrusions and behavioural modifications of ducal justice. Further, the 
petitions served to create or to emphasize the personal  connection between ruler 
and ruled for which the Farnese strove : both Barbara and Francesco referred to 
the  former’s personal service to the Farnese family, Barbara to influence the  duke’s 
decision, and Francesco to indicate the personal importance that he attached to 
 Barbara’s problems.
CONCLUSION
Alessandro  Mariano’s petition becomes clearer in this light. Mariano was aware 
of the high cost of justice. If he were blamed for this homicide, he faced steep fines, 
imprisonment or possible death. He therefore undertook to defend his innocence in 
this matter by offering to return to Parma and cooperate with the criminal judges. 
However, Mariano was clearly not totally innocent, or perhaps he had enemies within 
the judicial system. Therefore his participation in the judicial system was qualified : 
he would give himself up to the authorities, but he requested immunity from the law 
in all matters other than the homicide in question. This sense of negotiation captures 
very well the dynamic of petitioning : In order to function, the petitioning system had 
to offer real solutions to the problems of both government and population. Before 
65 An instance of this is clear in Parma in a letter of 1675, in which the mattinata performed by a group 
of students was met by the archebus of the soldier they wished to shame. One of them ended up dead. 
ASPR, Atti Giudiziali, Lettere di Giustizia, Agosto-Dicembre 1675, bb32. Cf. Davis (1971) ; Thomp-
son (1972).
66 ASPR, Uditore Criminale, Lettere Ducali ad Uditore Criminale, bb33, letter of 24 September 1695.
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they would give up their use of violence, Parmans needed an effective alternative to 
protect their interests and safety.
Petitions provided an unrivalled opportunity for the Farnese princes to assume 
non-violent authority over the widely dispersed, traditionally feudal, villages and 
hamlets that  comprised much of their territory. In Parma, this was surely aided by 
the relatively small size of the Duchy and its population, and the model presented 
here likely applies best to small-scale states such as those of northern Italy where 
such  communication could function efficiently. The Farnese dukes did not hesitate to 
meddle in the business of their magistracies, and they  consistently drew the power of 
the Dettatura closer to their individual purview. In  constructing this magistracy, the 
Farnese dukes ensured that requests for mercy were directed immediately to the top 
of the hierarchy. This personal identification of mercy with ducal persona was both 
patriarchal, creating a metaphorical kin network in which subjects could appeal to 
their padrone to intervene in their disputes, and functional, allowing for a  consistent 
presence of higher authority in the interactions between government and subject. 
At the same time, subjects’ submission to this authority was not the product of that 
authority in and of itself ; rather, subjects responded to the opportunity for ducal 
intervention in their quarrels, making any ‘civilizing process’ in Parma very much a 
cooperative affair between subjects and ruler.
The use of petitioning in such a light can also be brought to bear on the important 
historiographical issue of social  control. Tomás Mantecón and Gerd Schwerhoff, 
dealing specifically with neighbourhood  conflict and violence, make clear that 
 communal behavioural standards,  common ideas of violence, and an urge to negotiate 
settlements to  conflict were part and parcel of interactions between individuals 
and with the forces of state authority in early modern Europe67. In their views, the 
interaction of institution and neighbourhood – ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ – is 
the driver of ideas and practices of social  control. As Mantecón states, “popular 
spheres, social forces, and customary institutions never ceded their right to arbitrate 
disputes. Increasingly, they arbitrated everyday disputes by using local courts as the 
arena for discussion”68. Social discipline emerged from the goals and interactions of 
all members of society ; petitions  constitute a process by which those social goals are 
defined, elaborated and acted upon in legal settings.
The role of petitions across Europe as a tool used both by rulers, to inform 
themselves of and act upon the affairs of their subjects, and by those subjects, to 
find avenues for dispute resolution that precluded the necessities of violence and 
censured certain degrees of social behaviour, deserve further investigation in full-
scale. This article has shown that in Farnese Parma, the  control of violence cannot 
be seen as the result of one side or  another’s victory in the battle for social  control. 
Rather, as the state attempted to expand its real  control over the hearts and purses 
of subjects, individuals pursued those options which were, or seemed, most useful. 
Here the two perspectives on the decline of violence can  come together. The 
evolution of legal systems provided the opportunity for the displacement of violence 
and personal  conflict to abstract systems of threat and coercion. This is seen vividly 
in the preference of Parman soldiers for firearms display rather than gun violence ; 
in both the interactions that predicated a judicial process and in the judicial process 
67 Mantecón (2006, p. 268) ; Schwerhoff (2006, p. 236).
68 Mantecón (2006, p. 284).
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themselves, violence was diverted from physical action to theatrical posturing. 
People retained the mental structures that encouraged  competition and aggression, 
but the institutional structure in which these emotions were played out promoted the 
channelling of this  competition into non-violent arenas, such as displays of status, 
and the resolution of  conflict in the tribunal system.
The system had its weaknesses, of course. Those with personal and professional 
 connections to high levels of government obviously had better access to and success 
at the ducal court, as Barbara  Preti’s case vividly demonstrates. Additionally, it is 
important to recall that every successful petition that emerged from a court process 
dealing with a violent crime left a victim, or indeed, a double-victim : not only 
did the petitioner  commit violence against his victim, the state then abetted this 
victimization by choosing rehabilitation over retribution. This could not satisfy 
everyone. Further, we must recall that petitions had a fiscal  component as well. 
Each successful petition was taxed according to a rubric, and many petitioners 
found themselves in the position of having to appeal these costs as well. In terms of 
official corruption, cronyism and nepotism do not seem to be behind most ordinary 
petitions, but other archival deposits may prove otherwise. These petitions instead 
provide clear glimpses of the active choices made by Parmans of an alternative to 
personal violence in solving their social  conflicts. As seen above, this rejection of 
violence was visible in the petitions of both men and women who did not have the 
resources, material or social, to pursue the feud and vendetta that characterises much 
of the violence noted by historians in medieval and early modern Europe69.
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